The United States can phase out military funding to Israel without weakening its broader strategic partnership with the country

What's this about?

People disagree about whether the United States can stop military aid to Israel without hurting their wider team-up.

The key question asks if other ties can stay strong after military aid ends.

What supporters say

• Israel makes many weapons itself and could replace some U.S. aid over time.
• The two countries also share spy work, talks, tech, drills, and plans to stop missile attacks.
• These other ties could keep going through new deals, even if military aid stops.
• Israel might work with the United States while relying less on it for weapons.

What critics say

• Military aid helps connect the two countries’ armies, firms, and offices.
• Much U.S. aid pays for U.S. weapons, which helps American arms makers and jobs.
• Ending aid could make the two armies less ready to fight side by side.
• Less aid could give the United States less power to shape Israel’s choices.

How to read this

The number of points on each side does not show who is right; the strength of the proof matters more.

The bottom line

The evidence says a slow, careful end to military aid might keep much of the team-up alive.

But the bond would likely grow less close, and the United States would lose some power to shape events.

The claim is that the United States could end military funding for Israel without damaging the wider strategic partnership. The evidence suggests that this may be possible only through a gradual, carefully targeted phaseout—and that the relationship would probably lose some depth and U.S. influence along the way.

The case for

The U.S.-Israel relationship is broader than military financing alone. It also includes diplomatic coordination, intelligence sharing, joint exercises, technology cooperation, missile-defense projects and other security ties described in Congressional Research Service and Defense Department materials. Those channels could, in principle, continue through separate agreements and funding, even if Foreign Military Financing ended. 1

Israel also has significant military and industrial capabilities of its own. Studies by SIPRI, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Israeli strategic researchers describe advanced domestic defense production and relationships with other suppliers. That could allow Israel to replace at least some U.S.-funded purchases over time (see Figure 2). 2

This would not necessarily lead to a complete break with Washington. Israel might remain broadly aligned with the United States while becoming less dependent on it. The claim requires preserving a meaningful strategic relationship, not maintaining every current procurement arrangement or the same level of American influence. On that narrower test, Israel’s ability to absorb some substitution supports the possibility of continued cooperation. 3

The case against

Military funding is not simply a cash transfer. It is built into the procurement systems, industrial ties and bureaucratic routines that help hold the partnership together. The 2019–2028 memorandum promises $38 billion in U.S. security assistance, and appropriations records show that much of the financing is used to buy American defense equipment. Ending that predictable stream could disrupt long-term planning, ammunition supplies, maintenance, joint development and the political and industrial groups that sustain the relationship (see Figure 1). 4

Funding also supports interoperability and deterrence. Congressional analyses describe Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow as products of joint development and financing that created technical, organizational and operational links between the two countries (see Figure 3). RAND’s broader research on foreign military financing finds that aid can influence procurement, force structure, training and reliance on donor equipment. The institutional effects of ending it could therefore be greater than the dollar amount alone suggests. 5

A phaseout could further reduce Washington’s leverage over Israeli decisions. Assistance gives the United States influence over procurement and, potentially, policy choices. If Israel could turn to domestic production or other suppliers, it might remain aligned with Washington while becoming less responsive to American preferences. Reduced dependence would therefore have two effects: it could cushion Israel against a funding cutoff, but it could also weaken the close integration and bargaining power that make the relationship unusually strong. 6

U.S. funding also supports American defense-industrial interests and the congressional constituencies connected to them. Losing those ties could make the broader partnership harder to reproduce politically, even if intelligence, diplomacy and some military cooperation continued. 7

The bottom line

The evidence supports a qualified version of the claim, not its unqualified wording. A gradual phaseout that protects intelligence sharing, missile-defense cooperation, arms sales, exercises and diplomatic commitments could preserve a substantial strategic partnership.

But the evidence leans, with low confidence, against the idea that the partnership would remain fully intact. The strongest evidence on the opposing side shows that military financing is woven into procurement, interoperability, deterrence and U.S. leverage. Israel’s ability to find substitutes makes total realignment less likely, but the same substitution could reduce American influence and weaken institutional ties.

There is no directly comparable case showing what would happen after a complete U.S. funding phaseout. The outcome would depend heavily on what is ended, how quickly it happens and which channels are protected. The likely result is therefore neither an unchanged alliance nor a collapse, but a tradeoff: broad alignment could survive while the partnership’s current depth, dependence and U.S. leverage diminish.