Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) will enhance financial inclusion globally

What's this about?

People disagree about whether central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) will help more people use money services worldwide.

These digital coins may help, but success depends on access, cost, trust, and good design.

What supporters say

• Digital payments can prompt some people to open bank accounts and use more money services.
• CBDCs could offer a cheap, state-backed way to make digital payments.
• CBDCs could work without a steady internet link, helping people in places with weak networks.

What critics say

• CBDCs may raise fears about privacy, safety, and who can see people’s payments.
• People may still lack phones, internet links, digital skills, or enough money to use CBDCs.
• Early CBDC launches have not yet shown that large numbers of people will use them.

How to read this

The number of points on each side does not show who is right; the strength of the proof matters more.

The bottom line

CBDCs could help some people join formal money services, but they will not do this by themselves.

We are not sure yet that they will boost financial inclusion worldwide, and the evidence does not show that clearly.

CBDCs could help bring underserved people into formal finance, but there is little evidence yet that they will do so on a global scale. Their impact would depend less on the technology itself than on whether people can access, afford and trust it.

The case for

The strongest argument is that a well-designed CBDC could offer a low-cost, government-backed digital payment tool. Economic modelling by the IMF suggests that retail CBDCs in developing countries could bring some unbanked people into the formal financial system. The BIS has similarly described CBDCs as another possible route to digital payment and transaction accounts. But both assessments stress that the result would depend on design and distribution, not happen automatically. 1

There is some evidence that digital payments can encourage people to open formal accounts. World Bank research finds that receiving government payments and other funds digitally has prompted some unbanked adults to open accounts, while regular use of digital payments can lead to wider engagement with financial services. A CBDC that works with existing systems, costs little and is accepted by merchants could join this process. Still, the evidence does not show that CBDCs would work better than mobile money, bank accounts or other digital-payment services. 3

CBDCs might also reach people who cannot rely on a continuous internet connection. Offline payments could reduce the importance of weak networks, a feature that many central banks view as useful or important. The BIS reports that 49% of surveyed central banks considered offline retail CBDC payments vital, while another 49% considered them advantageous. This supports the feasibility of an inclusion feature, but not its affordability, reliability or likely use at global scale. 2

The case against

The central concern is that CBDCs may simply reproduce the barriers that already keep people outside formal finance. The IMF points to limited digital skills, unreliable electricity, lack of suitable devices and inadequate identification. World Bank figures show that internet access and digital-payment use remain incomplete even among people who already hold accounts: 70% of adults globally had internet access in 2021, while one billion account holders made no digital payments (see Figure 3). 4

Early experience also offers a warning, though it is limited. Nigeria’s eNaira has seen weak public uptake; in 2023, N13.98 billion circulated through it compared with N3.65 trillion in total currency. That comparison suggests limited scale, but currency circulation is not the same as the number of users or their level of financial inclusion. The case shows that launching a CBDC does not guarantee adoption, rather than proving that CBDCs cannot become useful under different policies. 5

Privacy and trust may be the strongest opposing argument. CBDCs could make financial activity more traceable and increase concerns about government or central-bank control. A peer-reviewed analysis argues that reduced financial privacy and greater state overreach could outweigh inclusion benefits compared with alternatives such as banking subsidies. That is a policy analysis, not a measured estimate of how many people would refuse to use CBDCs, but it identifies a serious trade-off. 6

The bottom line

The evidence supports CBDCs as a plausible but conditional tool, not the stronger claim that they will enhance financial inclusion globally. The balance is broadly even, with low confidence in any worldwide outcome.

The pro case is strongest on how CBDCs might work: low costs, interoperability, offline access and links to formal payments could help some underserved people. The opposing evidence is stronger in identifying concrete obstacles and showing that adoption has not yet been demonstrated. Although 91% of surveyed central banks were exploring CBDCs in 2024, that measures official interest—not improved inclusion.

The key unanswered question is whether governments can turn technical availability into sustained, trusted use among people who lack devices, identification, connectivity or digital skills. Until there is stronger evidence from actual users across countries, CBDCs remain a possible solution rather than a proven global force for inclusion.