Governments should be permitted to deport migrants to consenting third countries without prior connections

What's this about?

People disagree about whether governments may send migrants to other countries that agree to receive them.

The migrants may have no family, travel, or past link to those countries.

What supporters say

• Deals with safe countries could share the work and ease pressure on the first country.
• Sending migrants elsewhere might stop some people from taking risky, unapproved trips.

What critics say

• A country may promise safety, but its shelters, courts, and other safeguards may fail in real life.
• A country’s yes does not erase its duty to protect people from unfair harm or torture.
• Moving migrants could put them in danger if the new country cannot protect their basic rights.

How to read this

The number of points on each side does not show who is right; strong proof matters more than a long list.

The bottom line

These moves may work only with strict checks, real safety, and a fair review for each person.

The evidence does not support a broad power to send migrants anywhere just because another country agrees.

Governments are debating whether they should be allowed to deport migrants to countries that agree to receive them, even when those migrants have no previous connection there. The evidence supports such transfers only under strict conditions—not as a general power based on consent alone.

The case for

Third-country agreements could help share responsibility for people seeking protection. If the receiving country offers comparable rights, a functioning asylum system, suitable housing and enforceable safeguards, transferring cases could reduce pressure on the country where migrants first arrive. Research on the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement describes how responsibility can be divided and duplicate claims reduced when both systems provide similar protection and allow exceptions.1

That example, however, rests on a longstanding bilateral arrangement. It does not prove that governments should be free to send people to any unrelated country that agrees to accept them. The broader case for such arrangements comes from the scale of global displacement and the pressure on governments to cooperate, but that pressure does not by itself establish that these transfers are lawful or effective.

Supporters also argue that third-country processing could discourage irregular journeys. Governments have pursued offshore and other external-processing policies partly for this reason. But the available evidence records that these policies have been tried; it does not show that sending migrants to an unrelated consenting country reliably reduces dangerous or unauthorized journeys.2 Deterrence is therefore a policy argument, not a demonstrated result.

The case against

A government’s consent does not remove its legal duties. Under the Refugee Convention and the Convention against Torture, states must not send people to places where they face persecution or torture. Authorities must examine each person’s circumstances and the receiving country’s actual ability to provide protection. Consent alone cannot replace that assessment.3

The strongest warning comes from the UK Supreme Court’s decision on the proposed Rwanda arrangement. The court found substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers sent there faced a real risk of being returned to danger because of weaknesses in Rwanda’s asylum system and limited safeguards. The ruling did not say every third-country arrangement is unlawful. It did show why diplomatic promises are not enough without evidence of institutional capacity, independent monitoring and effective legal remedies.4

European human-rights cases point in the same direction. In *Hirsi Jamaa v Italy*, the European Court of Human Rights found violations after migrants were sent to Libya without adequate protection or individual review. In *M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece*, the court held that transfer to a country formally responsible for processing an asylum claim could still be unlawful when poor reception and asylum conditions created risks of inhuman treatment or indirect return to danger.

Transfers can also cause serious harm even where refoulement is not the immediate issue. Research into Australia’s offshore-processing system reported major mental-health damage linked to prolonged detention and uncertainty.5 That evidence concerns a particular policy and cannot predict every possible arrangement, but it highlights the welfare risks of moving people to unfamiliar countries without strong protections.

A lawful system would require individual screening, access to a genuine asylum procedure, protection against onward removal, judicial review, humane reception, family safeguards and independent monitoring. It would also need remedies that work when the receiving country fails to meet its promises. Those conditions would turn the proposal into a limited, reviewable transfer power—not permission based simply on consent and the absence of prior ties.

The bottom line

The evidence favours rejecting the claim as written, though not with high confidence. It supports carefully regulated responsibility-sharing when the receiving country has demonstrated that it can provide effective protection and fair procedures. It does not support a blanket rule allowing deportation to any consenting third country.

The legal principles are clearer than the real-world evidence. Court decisions and international guidance show why consent cannot be decisive, while direct research on the proposed unrestricted model remains limited. There is also no reliable general evidence that such transfers deter irregular migration. The central unanswered question is whether safeguards can be properly assessed and enforced when a country agrees to receive migrants but lacks dependable asylum institutions, monitoring or remedies.